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To an outside observer, the Eurozone crisis and the public’s dissatisfaction with austerity policies should
be beneficial for Europe’s social democratic parties. So why are so many currently consigned to
opposition? Using an analysis of speechmaking across three of Europe’s social democratic parties,
Isabelle Guinaudeau argues that the process of European integration has been a cause of
division. While some parties, such as the UK’s Labour party have actively moved towards the
political centre and embraced EU integration, others such as France’s Parti Socialiste have been
far less successful in depoliticising the European issue.
The domestic consequences of European integration have never been as visible as during the
Eurozone crisis, with budgets and austerity plans being decided in accordance with the European institutions. The
institutionalisation of the EU and the delegation of growing powers notably affect the capacity of domestic political
parties to implement their policies, and have signalled the emergence of EU-related political issues that are
important to voters. These consequences may shed light on the crisis of European Social-Democratic and Socialist
parties (SDPs) that are, for the moment, largely confined in opposition and have not seemed to benefit from citizens’
increased demand for macro-economic intervention in the context of the crisis.
On the one hand, opening economies, the European
competition policy and the monetary policy defined in
the EU’s Maastricht Treaty in 1992 put the traditional
advocates of state interventionism, industrial policy,
market regulation, redistribution and social protection
under strong pressure. On the other, large parties tend
to be divided over how to cope with this pressure. This
politicisation benefits their more radical challengers,
which are more united around EU-critical discourses, as
in the case of UKIP in the UK or, to an even greater
extent, parties of the radical left such as the German Die
Linke or the French Parti de Gauche. Mainstream left
parties face painful trade-offs given their commitment to
European integration, their willingness to signal a
coherence of their policy proposals with their ideological
tradition, their incentives to respond to dissatisfied
voters and their reluctance to politicise an issue that
would benefit challenger parties.
Of course, to the extent that parties cannot be forced to
react to EU-related transformations, get involved at the
EU-level, or even adjust their proposals to European
law, these trends may have only limited consequences if
they are not perceived and emphasised by partisan
actors. And SDPs face different circumstances and
opportunities from country to country. For example, the
reduction in political alternatives is more palpable in
France, Germany or in Scandinavia than in the United
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Kingdom, given the advanced stage of deregulation and liberalisation reached in the 1980s and the decision not to
adopt the euro. The British Labour party even benefited from the country’s adjustment to European social,
environmental and health norms, notably after Tony Blair signed the European Social Charter. It is thus particularly
interesting to compare how Europeanisation is perceived and handled in different mainstream parties. With this
question in mind, I have systematically analysed speeches held at the national conferences of the British Labour
party, French Parti Socialiste and German Sozial-demokratische Partei Deutschlands between 1985 and 2009.
The deliberation of programmatic lines, with contributions from party members on a relatively broad basis, is a better
reflection of the diversity of conceptions at work than can be brought to light by official documents. They show that
after a period of enthusiasm following the re-launching of integration in the 1980s, the adaptive pressure stemming
from the EU is evident within all three parties, specifically from the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. This text was
seen, particularly within the left factions, to be too liberal, too modest with respect to workers’ rights, too
undemocratic and too important not to be adopted by referendum. In subsequent years, numerous speakers
continued to regret the EU’s inertia in the fields of unemployment and workers’ rights and the pressures towards
liberalisation, multiplying business relocations and restrictions on workers’ rights. Fears were also expressed
regarding the forthcoming Eastward enlargement, which was expected by some to dilute the European project into a
free-trade area that might be subject to fiscal, social and ecological dumping.
However, all three parties have been divided over the appropriate response to these challenges. Their leaderships
asserted their commitment to Europe and adopted a pragmatic pro-EU stance, based on the conviction that a social-
democratic policy could no longer be implemented except at the European level. They also made calls for realism on
the room to manoeuvre in intergovernmental negotiations, and on the shrinking domestic possibilities for left-wing
macroeconomic policies, and the strategies of political competitors in European matters. Minority factions, on the
other hand, have been less prone to political compromises in the name of European integration. Their
representatives may also capitalise on EU contestation to challenge the party leadership, which usually reacts by
depoliticising Europe and stigmatising these opponents as “populist”, “demagogic”, or “Eurosceptic”.
This strategy proved successful in the SPD and in the Labour party, where the 1990s ended in a state of relative
cohesion on European matters. For example, Tony Benn and Dennis Skinner, the two most leftist members of the
Labour national committee, were marginalised after the rejection of their proposal for a referendum. The designation
of John Smith at the head of the Labour party, the eviction of Tony Benn from the national committee and the
withdrawal of Bryan Gould, leader of the Labour MPs hostile to the Maastricht Treaty, from the shadow ministry of
trade and industry, reinforced the marginalisation of the left wing of the party and of arguments centred on European
constraints. At the 1996 Labour conference, Europe was thus exclusively presented from the point of view of
opportunities and this pro-European stance became a pillar of Labour’s opposition strategy.
Constrained by stronger far left organisations articulating critiques of the EU, and by stronger pressure deriving from
Europeanisation, the PS leadership was less successful than the SPD and the Labour party in depoliticising
European integration. The hopes of rebalancing integration to the advantage of employment and social policies,
raised by the seizure of power by SDPs in twelve out of the fifteen member states, rapidly shrunk given the modest
results of the Amsterdam and Nice summits, and were overshadowed by critical discourses on EU-related
constraints. More recently, French Socialists have experienced the most vivid controversies over the European
Constitutional Treaty put to a referendum in May 2005. Supporters of the majority motion, led by the party leader
François Hollande, expressed positive expectations about the treaty, while several factions considered that it failed
to adequately address the “democratic deficit”, firm relocations, and the liberalisation of public services, and
appealed for opposition to any further steps toward European integration.
The growing visibility of the social implications of European integration and the electoral success of Eurosceptic
parties in several member states could make it increasingly difficult to downplay the contestation of EU policies.
Overcoming the Social-democratic “European dilemma” may require that they adjust their political project to the
reality of open economies that are subject to common monetary and competition policies, or that they cooperate
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efficiently in order to push for reforms of the European treaties and for the adoption of Social-Democratic policies at
the European level.
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